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1 Introduction and set-up of the paper 
 
 
 
'UN peacekeeping' and 'Africa' are not a natural fit. The combination of words is 
associated more often with failures than with success stories. While UN 
peacekeeping operations are in most cases anyhow confronted with a multitude 
of intertwined problems, this seems to be even worse in Africa. African 
operations have to react more than averagely to inter- as well as intrastate 
conflicts based upon ethnic tension, to conflicts starting from extreme poverty 
or the abuse of natural resources, and to situations in which governments are 
failing to do what governments should do. In the present paper the mandates of 
the six ongoing UN peacekeeping operations on African soil are analysed from 
the perspective of their (desired) contribution to the establishment of good 
governance structures.  
 
The paper starts by giving some general background on peacekeeping in Africa 
and on the concept of good governance (section 2), followed by a detailed 
investigation of good governance at six ongoing African peacekeeping 
operations (section 3). Having done so, the paper continues by presenting 
more general observations as to trends in UN peacekeeping and their 
consequences for Africa (section 4), followed by a summary and some overall 
concluding observations (section 5).  
 
The research has been concluded at 1 May 2007. 
 
                                            
* Prof Willem van Genugten, Professor of International Law, Tilburg University, The 
Netherlands. 
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2 The core concepts of the paper 
2.1 Peacekeeping in Africa  
Since its first official peacekeeping operation – the United Nations Emergency 
Force (UNEF 1), active in the Middle East from 1956 to 1967 – the UN have 
deployed about sixty such operations. They have been started and maintained 
for a variety of reasons which however are often not evidently covered by the 
word 'peacekeeping'. Sometimes there is no peace to be kept at all, and is the 
mandate of the missions more related to peace-enforcement – in which cases 
the UN these days often cooperates with NATO – or to, for instance, 
reconstruction of governmental and other structures. In the latter case, the label 
'peace-building' is commonly used. Nevertheless, the word 'peacekeeping' is 
still standard – including within the UN itself – as an overall phrase for this 
variety of operations.  
 
Using different labels, one should keep in mind that this is about more than 
words only. The so-called 'Brahimi report', evaluating the UN peacekeeping 
system after some failures in the early 1990s and to be discussed from the 
perspective of the present paper later on, states that it should have come as no 
surprise 
 
…that some of the missions of the past decade would be particularly 
hard to accomplish: they tended to deploy where conflict had not 
resulted in victory for any side, where a military stalemate or 
international pressure or both had brought fighting to a halt but at 
least some of the parties to the conflict were not seriously committed 
to ending the confrontation. United Nations operations thus did not 
deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them. In such 
complex operations, peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local 
environment while peace-builders work to make that environment 
self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to 
peacekeeping forces, making peacekeepers and peace-builders 
inseparable partners.1
                                            
1  Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi. UN 
Doc A/55/305, 21 August 2000 at viii. 
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This language reflects the dynamics in (thinking about) peacekeeping 
operations and shows some of the problems this paper will discuss in sections 
two and three.  
 
In this section the observation is maintained that 16 out of the 44 operations of 
the past related to African States, while six out of the current 15 operations – 
situation as of 1 May 2007 – are deployed in Africa.2 A relatively substantial 
number, even if we keep in mind that Africa is a large continent, as of now 
encompassing 53 states at a total of 192 UN Member States. African 
operations in the past took place in thirteen states: Angola, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Libya, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Uganda. As of now operations are going on in Côte 
d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia, 
Sudan, and the Western Sahara.3
2.2 Good governance 
  
 
Over the last couple of decades, a wealth of academic and policy-oriented 
literature on good governance has been produced, clarifying and criticising the 
concept as well as making it as operative as possible. The latter relates to the 
use of the concept in the areas of especially international development and 
international economic relations, for example, through practices developed by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).4 Further to that, the 
concept is elaborated upon in, for instance, the context of discussions on the 
UN human rights machinery.5
                                            
2  UN 
 The present paper does not intend to discuss the 
concept of good governance in itself, but focuses upon its links to the field of 
peace and security. As a matter of fact, it would be easy to elaborate in a 
lengthy way upon the concept of good governance, but for the present paper it 
would do to follow the no-nonsense approach as taken by, amongst others, the 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ 17 Jul. 
3  Ibid.  
4  See, most recently, Hout Politics of Aid Selectivity. 
5  See, out of many sources, Alfredson, Clapp and Sano (eds) Human Rights and Good 
Governance, and Sepulveda et al (eds) Human Rights Reference Handbook 407-409. 
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(UNESCAP). According to UNESCAP, 'governance' means, simply put, "the 
process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are 
implemented (or not implemented)", while the word governance is used "in 
several contexts such as corporate governance, international governance, 
national governance and local governance".6
It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, 
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and 
follows the rule of law.
 
 
In the context of the present paper the focus will be on the establishment of 
effective national governments, on the (human rights and other) values they 
have to take into account when performing their governmental tasks, and on 
the role UN peacekeepers can play in the process of paving the way towards a 
situation in which national governments can effectively "handle their own 
business". In the words of UNESCAP, further dividing the issue in manageable 
parts, one would have to take into account eight major factors/characteristics 
when discussing and practising good governance:  
 
7
Further to that, or better: as part of that, it also "assures that corruption is 
minimized", that "the views of minorities are taken into account", that "the 
voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making" and that 
it is also "responsive to the present and future needs of society".
 
 
8
• Participation by both men and women could be either direct or through 
legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. Representative 
democracy does not necessarily mean that the concerns of the most 
vulnerable in society would be taken into consideration in decision-
  
 
Before proceeding, a few explanatory words might be needed on the sub-
concepts used by UNESCAP that are relevant for the present paper as well. In 
the order in which the core characteristics have been presented before:  
 
                                            
6  UN http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp 17 Jul. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Ibid. 
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making. Participation needs to be informed and organised. This means 
freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an 
organised civil society on the other hand. 
• Consensus oriented. Good governance requires mediation of the 
different interests in society to reach a broad consensus on what is in the 
best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It 
also requires a broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for 
sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such 
development. 
• Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. Not only 
governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society 
organisations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional 
stakeholders. Who is accountable to whom varies depending on whether 
decisions or actions taken are internal or external to an organisation or 
institution. In general an organisation or an institution is accountable to 
those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Accountability 
cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law. 
• Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforcement are 
done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that 
information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be 
affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that 
enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily 
understandable forms and media. 
• Responsiveness. Good governance requires that institutions and 
processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe. 
• Effectiveness and efficiency. Good governance means that processes 
and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while 
making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of 
efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable 
use of natural resources and – in the long run – the protection of the 
environment. 
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• Equity and inclusiveness. A society’s well being depends on ensuring 
that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel 
excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups, but 
particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or 
maintain their well being. 
• Rule of law. Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are 
enforced impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, 
particularly those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an 
independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force.9
 
I would like to add two issues, relevant for the remainder of this paper. The first 
issue relates to the notion that time and again one has to transcend the idea 
that 'governance' is still basically about (traditional) governments who are in the 
lead of 'their' sovereign states. Governments are no doubt extremely important 
and central to the concept of good governance, but the major tasks they have 
to fulfil cannot be separated from non-state actors, such as populations, 
minorities included, companies and non-governmental organisations, the latter 
including for instance the media (although these are often also to be considered 
as state actors). Some of these non-state actors are already mentioned in the 
point-wise presented overview of core characteristics of good governance 
borrowed from UNESCAP, while it could be added here – having an eye upon 
Africa – mixes of state and non-state actors, such as influential land lords, 
associations of farmers, and cooperatives, and state-based international actors 
such as the International Financial Institutions (mainly the World Bank and the 
IMF) and, in the context of the present paper, UN peacekeeping forces.  
 
 
The second issue concerns reading the eight key characteristics of good 
governance with ‘human rights eyes’. The word 'participation' does include 
some core human rights (for instance: the freedom of association and the 
freedom of expression), while UNESCAP’s words 'consensus oriented' do 
touch upon the notion of the so-called third generation of human rights, by 
                                            
9  The descriptions of the eight sub-concepts are based upon UNESCAP’s wordings, and 
slightly modified and adapted to the scope of the present paper. 
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referring to the long-term perspective "on what is needed for sustainable 
human development". Further to that, the description of 'effectiveness and 
efficiency' includes notions such as "sustainable use of natural resources and 
the protection of the environment", being notions that are more and more linked 
to the concept of human rights. In addition, the phrase 'rule of law' is rightly said 
to refer to the "full protection of human rights", although it might mean much 
more than the UNESCAP author(s) of that line had in mind when writing it 
down. That is to say: the United Nations have adopted about hundred human 
rights instruments,10
3 Peacekeeping operations in Africa and good governance 
 covering a huge diversity of rights. Some of these rights 
would be more important than others, in general as well as from the perspective 
of good governance. The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, for 
instance, would be more relevant in that respect than the Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages. 
Some might even see the latter as a good governance issue, but in that case 
good governance would embrace everything, while the concept is already (too) 
broad. 
 
 
3.1  Introduction  
Twenty-two UN peacekeeping operations of the past and the present related or 
still relate to Africa. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all of 
them, be it only from a good governance perspective, while, on the other hand, 
it would also be risky to draw general conclusions as to UN peacekeeping 
operations in Africa without carefully discussing each of them on an individual 
basis. In terms of methodology, I therefore made the choice to discuss the (six) 
operations going on as of 1 May 2007, thereby focusing upon their mandates, 
official resolutions and statements as to their aims, and reading these with the 
good governance glasses as grinded in the introductory chapter of this paper.  
 
                                            
10  See, ia, UJ http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm 17 Jul. 
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3.2 Six ongoing African operations  
The six UN operations will be discussed in chronological order, thereby first for 
a correct understanding shortly describing to what problem they want to be the 
solution,11
3.2.1 Western Sahara (MINURSO, 1991- ) 
 followed by a short presentation of the relevant parts of their 
mandates.  
 
Being administered by Spain until 1976, the Western Sahara is since then – 
leaving aside the earliest years after 1976 when neighbouring country 
Mauritania also wanted to incorporate the territory – claimed by Morocco as 
well as the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de 
Oro (Frente POLISARIO). Following the acceptance of 'settlement proposals' 
by the two parties in 1988, the UN Security Council decided in 1991 to establish 
the Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).12 Since 1991, 
the Security Council adopted another 34 resolutions, in most cases related to 
the extension of the mandate – as of now until 31 October 200713 - and the 
adaptation of the mandate to new challenges.14
• to implement the repatriation programme (…); 
  
 
MINURSO is mandated to monitor the ceasefire, verify the reduction of 
Moroccan troops from the Western Sahara, et cetera, but also:  
 
• to identify and register qualified voters; 
• to organise and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the 
results.15
                                            
11  The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations is maintaining a website for each 
country. These websites have served as the main source of information for the 
descriptions of the country situations, other sources having been consulted where relevant 
for a correct understanding. It should be added that the UN websites are much more 
detailed than the descriptions presented here. The latter can be seen as short summaries 
of often long histories, minimally needed in order to understand the reasoning behind the 
six operations. In later sections, references will be made to the relevant websites.  
12  SC Resolution 690, 29 April 1991. 
13  SC Resolution 1754, 30 April 2007. 
 
14  See for an overview: UN http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso/res.html 17 Jul. 
15  UN http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso/mandate.html 17 Jul. 
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3.2.2 Liberia (UNOMIL/UNOL/UNMIL, 1993 - ) 
Liberia, being an independent republic since 1847, was confronted at the end of 
the 1980s with a devastating civil war. The Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), undertook various initiatives aimed at a peaceful 
settlement. These initiatives included an ECOWAS’s observer force, supported 
by a UN Security Council resolution imposing an arms embargo on Liberia.16 
After ECOWAS brokered a peace agreement, the Security Council in 1993 
established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). UNOMIL 
ended in 1997. Its tasks included to exercise good offices in support of the 
efforts of the ECOWAS and the Liberian National Transitional Government to 
implement the peace agreements, to investigate human rights violations and 
assist local human rights groups, and to observe and verify elections.17
In November 1997, following the completion of UNOMIL’s mandate, the UN 
established the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia 
(UNOL). This operation had a mandate to, inter alia, assist the government in 
consolidating peace following the July 1997 multiparty elections.
 
 
18 However, as 
the UN stated, the peace-building efforts of UNOL "were seriously hindered by 
the inability of the Government and opposition party leaders to resolve their 
differences over key issues of governance", while the systematic abuses of 
human rights, the exclusion and harassment of political opponents and the 
absence of security sector reform contributed to the resumption of civil war in 
Liberia, "prompting the international community to call on the warring parties to 
seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict".19 As a reaction, in September 
2003, the Security Council decided to establish the present United Nations 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).20 Its mandate – extended several times, as of now 
until September 200721
                                            
16  17 Jul 
 – includes, apart from the core task to observe and 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/background.html 17 Jul. 
17  SC Resolutions 866, 22 September 1993 and 1020, 10 November 1995. Also see UN 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unomil.htm 17 Jul. 
18  UN http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/background.html 17 Jul. 
19  UN http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/background.html 17 Jul. 
20  SC Resolution 1509, 19 September 2003. 
21  SC Resolution 1750, 30 March 2007, at par 1. 
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monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and to investigate 
violations of the ceasefire and related peace and security obstructions, the 
following tasks: 
 
• to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance (…); 
• to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human 
rights in Liberia, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including 
refugees, returning refugees and internally displaced persons, women, 
children, and demobilised child soldiers (…); 
• to assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and 
restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic 
policing, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to 
otherwise assist in the training of civilian police (…); 
• to assist the transitional government in the formation of a new and 
restructured Liberian military (…); 
• to assist the transitional Government (…) in re-establishment of national 
authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a 
functioning administrative structure at both the national and local levels; 
• to assist the transitional government (...) in developing a strategy to 
consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal 
framework and judicial and correctional institutions; 
• to assist the transitional government in restoring proper administration of 
natural resources; 
• to assist the transitional government (…) in preparing for national 
elections (…).22
 
 
3.2.3 Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, 1999- ) 
Having become an independent state in 1960, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), has gone through major conflicts and difficult transitional 
periods, already leading to a UN Peacekeeping Operation in the 1960s.23
                                            
22  SC Resolution 1509, 19 September 2003. 
 That 
23  See: UN http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Monuc.htm 17 Jul. 
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force, which will be further neglected here, is said to have left the country 
"united, but politically unsettled and facing continued secessionist threats in key 
regions".24 Following Mobutu’s coup of 1965, the country neutralised the 
political opposition and thwarted secessionist tendencies with methods, 
including the arrest and humiliation of former allies and the elimination of 
independent labour unions that were "authoritarian but not unusual among 
Third World countries at that time".25 Political and economic initiatives taken by 
Mobutu in the 1970s were confronted with serious resistance and finally 
contributed to the civil wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-1999.26
a multidisciplinary staff of personnel in the fields of human rights, 
humanitarian affairs, public information, medical support, child 
protection, political affairs and administrative support … shall 
constitute the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUC).
 
 
The latter civil war was ‘concluded’ by the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, signed 
by the warring parties in July-August 1999. After some interim proposals and 
measures, not very relevant for the present paper, the UN Security Council 
decided in November 1999 that the personnel authorised under its previous 
resolutions on the situation in the DRC, including  
 
27
A few months later, the Security Council formulated MONUC’s mandate.
  
 
28
• to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with 
particular attention to vulnerable groups including women, children and 
demobilised child soldiers (…). 
 It 
included, apart from a series of military aspects related to the ceasefire 
agreement, issues such as: 
 
 
                                            
24  Copson Democratic Republic of the Congo 3. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid at 4-9. 
27  SC Resolution 1279, 30 November 1999, at par 4. 
28  SC Resolution 1291, 24 February 2000. 
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In 2004, MONUC’s mandate was revised and updated.29 Since then the 
mandate – as of now extended until 15 May 200730
• to contribute to arrangements taken for the security of the institutions 
and the protection of officials of the Transition in Kinshasa until the 
integrated police unit for Kinshasa is ready to take on this responsibility 
and assist the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of order in other 
strategic areas (…);  
 – includes: 
 
• to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which 
humanitarian assistance is provided, and assist in the voluntary return of 
refugees and internally displaced persons; 
• to contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process (…), 
by assisting in the establishment of a secure environment for free, 
transparent and peaceful elections to take place. 
 
It was further decided, by the same Resolution, that MONUC will also have the 
mandate to provide advice and assistance to the transitional government and 
authorities, as to: 
 
• essential legislation, including the future constitution; 
• security sector reform, including the integration of national defence and 
internal security forces together with disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration, and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, 
while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights 
and fundamental freedoms; 
• the electoral process. 
 
3.2.4 Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE, 2000 - )  
Fighting between Eritrea and Ethiopia erupted in May 1998, as a result of a 
border dispute. Successively, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
organised a summit in Algiers in July 1999, at which the two parties accepted a 
                                            
29  SC Resolution 1565, 1 October 2004. 
30  SC Resolution 1751, 13 April 2007. 
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peace document. Despite the agreement, the fighting between the two states 
erupted again in May 2000, leading to renewed peace talks in Algiers and 
another peace agreement, signed in June 2000.31
The new agreement called upon the UN, in cooperation with the OAU, to 
establish a peacekeeping operation. On 31 July 2000 the UN Security Council 
decided to establish the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
(UNMEE).
  
 
32 The core of the mandate – as of now extended until 31 July 200733 
– relates to the cessation of the hostilities.34
coordinate the Mission’s activities in the temporary security zone and 
areas adjacent to it with humanitarian and human rights activities of 
the United Nations and other organizations in those areas.
 In a resolution of September 2000, 
UNMEE’s mandate was expanded with, among other things, the task to  
 
35
3.2.5 Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI/UNOCI, 2003- ) 
  
 
 
Côte d’Ivoire, having become an independent state in 1960, had a relatively 
good start in terms of political stability and socio-economic prosperity. Following 
the death of its founding leader in 1993, however, it was confronted with a 
power struggle, which generated intense political instability. In 2001, the new 
president organised a forum for national reconciliation to address the issues 
that had polarised the Ivorian people, including the questions of nationality, land 
ownership, the disputed legitimacy of his government and the conditions of 
service of the security forces. Following the forum, four core Ivorian leaders 
issued a communiqué in which, among other things, they agreed to oppose 
undemocratic avenues to power and to create a broad-based national electoral 
commission. The leaders also agreed to form a new government of national 
unity. These steps towards national reconciliation and reducing tensions in 
Côte d’Ivoire were, however, strongly disrupted by the crisis of September 
                                            
31  UN http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/background.html 17 Jul.  
32  SC Resolution 1312, 31 July 2000, at par 1. 
33  SC Resolution 1741, 30 January 2007.  
34  SC Resolution 1312, 31 July 2000. 
35  SC Resolution 1320, 15 September 2000. 
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2002, with among other things, its attacks on military installations, burning 
downs of dwellings and the displacement of people.36
The ECOWAS Contact Group on Côte d’Ivoire began mediation efforts in 
September 2002, leading to a cessation of the hostilities and negotiations on a 
political agreement between the fighting parties. The peace talks finally led to 
the establishment an ECOWAS Peace Force for Côte d’Ivoire and an appeal to 
the African Union and the United Nations to further assist ECOWAS to resolve 
the Ivorian crisis.
 
 
37 The appeal was followed by the French initiative to organise 
a roundtable, in January 2003 resulting in the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis 
Agreement. The agreement included the creation of a government of national 
reconciliation, that would have to prepare a timetable for credible and 
transparent national elections and would have to take care of, among other 
things, the creation of a human rights commission consisting of representatives 
from all parties, the drawing up of a voters roll, the independence of the justice 
system with respect to electoral disputes, and the implementation of a land 
tenure regime.38
The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement also expressed the wish to UN support. In 
response to that request, in May 2003, the UN Security Council decided to 
establish a United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI).
  
 
39 The mission 
had as its mandate, in short, to facilitate the implementation of the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement. Already in February 2004, however, the UN Security 
Council decided to establish its successor: the United Nations Operation in 
Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).40 Its mandate included the monitoring of the 2003 
agreement and peace and security issues linked to that.41 Further to that, the 
UNOCI mandate – as of now extended until 30 June 200742
                                            
36  UN 
 – provides for the 
following tasks:  
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minuci/background.html 17 Jul.  
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid. 
39  SC Resolution 1479, 13 May 2003. 
40  SC Resolution 1528, 27 February 2004. 
41  Ibid at par 6, a-j.  
42  SC Resolution 1739, 10 January 2007. 
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• to facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance 
(…); 
• to facilitate (...) the re-establishment by the Government of National 
Reconciliation of the authority of the state throughout Côte d’Ivoire; 
• to provide oversight, guidance and technical assistance to the 
Government of National Reconciliation (…) to prepare for and assist in 
the conduct of free, fair and transparent electoral processes linked to the 
implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, in particular the 
presidential election; 
• to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte 
d’Ivoire with special attention to violence committed against women and 
girls, and to help investigate human rights violations with a view to help 
ending impunity; 
• to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNOCI 
among local communities and the parties, through an effective public 
information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of a UN 
radio broadcasting capability; 
• to assist the Government of National Reconciliation (…) in restoring a 
civilian policing presence throughout Côte d’Ivoire, and to advise the 
Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of the 
internal security services;  
• to assist the Government of National Reconciliation (…) in re-
establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout 
Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
Since 2004, the mandate is still basically the same, although it now also 
includes such issues as: 
 
• to contribute (…) to the security of the operations of identification of the 
population and registration of voters (…);  
• to contribute (…) to the security of the areas where voting is to take 
place;  
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• to provide (…) for logistical support for the Independent Electoral 
Commission, in particular for the transportation of electoral material.43
 
 
3.2.6 Sudan (UNAMIS/UNMIS, 2004 - ) 
Sudan became independent in 1956 and has had many conflicts since then. 
The recently ended north-south civil war began in 1983. For about two 
decades, the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A), the main rebel movement in the south, fought over resources, 
power, the role of religion in the state, and self-determination. Over two million 
people died, four million were uprooted and some 600,000 people fled the 
country as refugees. In July 2002, the parties to the conflict signed the 
'Machakos Protocol', in which they reached a specific agreement on a broad 
framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process 
and the structures of government, as well as, among other things, on the right 
to self-determination for the people of South Sudan. The parties agreed to 
continue talks on the outstanding issues of power sharing, wealth sharing, 
human rights and a ceasefire.44
Supporting the outcome of the peace process, the UN Security Council decided 
in June 2004 to establish a political mission, called the United Nations Advance 
Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS).
  
 
45 The mission was mandated, among other 
things, to prepare for the introduction of a peace support operation.46 As a 
response to the escalating crisis in Darfur the UN Security Council decided to 
assign additional tasks to UNAMIS, alongside the leading role the African Union 
played in the negotiations on a political solution to the conflict.47
                                            
43  SC Resolution 1739, 10 January 2007, at par 2 (j).  
 In January 
2005, the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A signed a peace agreement, 
related to, among other things, outstanding issues remaining after the 
Machakos Protocol. It included provisions on security arrangements, power-
sharing in the capital of Khartoum, some autonomy for the south, and more 
44  UN http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmis/background.html 17 Jul.  
45  SC Resolution 1547, 11 June 2004. 
46  UN http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmis/background.html 17 Jul.  
47  SC Resolution 1556, 30 July 2004.  
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equitable distribution of economic resources, including oil.48
to a negotiated settlement on the basis of a democratic system of 
governance which, on the one hand, recognizes the right of the 
people of Southern Sudan to self-determination and seeks to make 
unity attractive during the Interim Period, while at the same time [it] is 
founded on the values of justice, democracy, good governance, 
respect for fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, mutual 
understanding and tolerance of diversity within the realities of the 
Sudan.
 The Chapeau to 
the agreement states that the parties are committed –  
  
49
Further to that, it was stated that the successful implementation of the 
agreement "shall provide a model for good governance in the Sudan".
 
 
50
In March 2005 the UN Security Council decided to establish the United Nations 
Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS).
  
 
51 The operation incorporates the tasks 
performed by UNAMIS and has a mandate – as of now extended until 31 
October 200752
• to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in 
addressing the need for a national inclusive approach, including the role 
of women, towards reconciliation and peacebuilding; 
 – to support the implementation of the peace agreement, et 
cetera, but also: 
 
• to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (…) in 
restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic 
policing, to develop a police training and evaluation programme, and to 
otherwise assist in the training of civilian police; 
• to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the 
protection of human rights of all people of Sudan (…);  
                                            
48  Ibid. 
49  ReliefWeb http://www.reliefweb.int/ 17 Jul.  
50  Ibid. 
51  SC Resolution 1590, 24 March 2005. 
52  SC Resolution 1755, 30 April 2007. 
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• to provide guidance and technical assistance to the parties to the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (…) to support the preparations for 
and conduct of elections and referenda provided for by the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
 
In August 2006 the UN Security Council decided to expand the mandate of 
UNMIS to Darfur, in order to support implementation of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement of May 2006 and the N’djamena Agreement on Humanitarian 
Cease-fire on the Conflict in Darfur.53
• to assist the parties (…) in the preparations for and conduct of 
referendums provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement;  
 The mandate since then includes, among 
other things, the tasks:  
 
• to assist the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement in promoting the rule 
of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human 
rights of all people of the Sudan through a comprehensive and 
coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing 
to long-term peace and stability and to assist the parties to the Darfur 
Peace Agreement to develop and consolidate the national legal 
framework. 
 
 
3.3 The six mandates under a good governance lens 
In the present section, the notions of good governance as elaborated upon in 
the introductory chapter of this paper will be linked to the descriptions of the six 
mandates as performed in the previous section.  
 
3.3.1 Western Sahara 
The mission in Western Sahara is even at first sight a ‘good governance 
mission’, although at its beginning (in 1991) the words 'good governance' were 
not yet very common, at least not in peace and security circles. In the results 
                                            
53  SC Resolution 1706, 31 August 2006, at par 1, refers to par 8, 9 and 12 as new elements 
of the mandate. 
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the mission aims for, one can see many of the good governance elements as 
discussed in section one, especially under the labels of 'participation', 
'consensus oriented' (that is to say: trying to find a way out, while "balancing 
different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society", but not 
necessarily leading to a real consensus; that is also part and parcel of 
referenda), 'accountability' (choosing for a system in which the government "is 
accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions"), 
'transparency' (decision-making, based on information that is "freely available 
and directly accessible"), 'equity and inclusiveness' (ensuring that all persons 
belonging to the Western-Sahara people "feel that they have a stake [in the 
referendum] and do not feel excluded"), and finally: 'the rule of law' (accept the 
outcome of the referendum, while in the (long) process of working towards it, 
enforcing the (legal) rules of the games impartially, with respect for such human 
rights as freedom of expression, the right not to be detained for political 
reasons, et cetera).  
 
Also the other elements, mentioned before, such as taking care that the future 
government will be "responsive to the present and future needs of society" are 
clearly part of the mission’s task. The latter is closely related to a right which is 
generally seen as either a right that belongs to the human rights codex or as a 
collective right that precedes individual human rights: the right to self-
determination of peoples. It should be noted that the right to self-determination 
has been recognised in a series of UN documents and legal instruments, 
amongst other things, in common article 1 to the 1966 UN Covenants on Civil 
and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It is also 
considered to be a right with a peremptory character, as affirmed in case law by 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).54
3.3.2 Liberia 
 
 
The UN peacekeeping operation in Liberia is also in many ways a good 
governance operation, although a bit less explicitly and detailed as is the case 
                                            
54  See eg the case on East-Timor, Portugal v Australia ICJ Reports 1995, 102. On the legal 
character of the right to self-determination, see Crawford State Responsibility 246-247.  
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with the operation in Western Sahara. Nevertheless, elements such as 
'participation' are reflected in the issue of the assistance of the government as 
to the preparation of national elections (although it should be observed that 
even free and fair elections do not necessarily lead to good and equitable 
participation in the governments afterwards). Notions as the ones on 
transparency and responsiveness are reflected in, among other things, the 
mandate to assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and 
restructuring the police force of Liberia "consistent with democratic policing", 
while issues such as effectiveness and efficiency can be found back in the 
mandate to assist the government in the re-establishment of national authority 
throughout the country, "including the establishment of a functioning 
administrative structure at both the national and local levels" and in words such 
as "developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions".  
 
Further to this, there is quite some attention in the mandate of the Liberian 
peacekeeping operation for the rule of law ("consolidate (…) a national legal 
framework and judicial and correctional institutions") and for human rights, 
including the rights of vulnerable groups (such as refugees and internally 
displaced persons, women, children, and demobilised child soldiers).  
 
Finally, in relation to Liberia it is worth recalling that according to UNESCAP 
"the concept of efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the 
sustainable use of natural resources (…)". The (ab)use of natural resources, 
still being a major issue in Liberia, is covered within the mandate of the UN 
operation by the task "to assist the transitional government in restoring proper 
administration of natural resources". 
 
3.3.3 Democratic Republic of the Congo 
As is the case with Liberia, the UN operation in the Congo is first of all a peace 
and security mission. Nevertheless, in the case of the Congo as well, it is clear 
that the UN Security Council is convinced that a standstill in the hostilities is 
only a part of the larger scene, including the need of establishing sustainable 
governance structures, based upon respect for underlying core values. Notions 
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such as participation can be found in the mandate lines on contributing to "the 
successful completion of the electoral process" and "assisting in the 
establishment of a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful 
elections to take place", while the effectiveness and efficiency of core tasks of 
the government, in casu performing its police and defence tasks, are reflected 
in such notions as "to contribute to arrangements taken for the security of the 
institutions and the protection of officials of the Transition in Kinshasa", "assist 
the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of order in other strategic areas" 
and "security sector reform, including the integration of national defence and 
internal security forces".  
 
It is also interesting to observe from a good governance perspective that the 
mandate speaks of training and monitoring the police, "while ensuring that they 
are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms". 
Further to this the human rights issue is again mentioned in relation to 
vulnerable groups, while the mandate also speaks of assisting "in the voluntary 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons". That is an issue of refugee 
law as well as human rights law. The rule of law, finally, is reflected in such 
notions as providing "advice and assistance to the transitional government and 
authorities, as to essential legislation, including the future constitution". 
 
3.3.4 Ethiopia and Eritrea 
Although several other ongoing UN peacekeeping operations in Africa are 
dealing with transboundary issues, the operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea is the 
only one to deal with a real inter-state (border) conflict. And where the core of 
the mandate relates to the cessation of the hostilities, the governance 
structures of both parties are not addressed. The mandate speaks of the task 
"to coordinate the Mission’s activities (…) with humanitarian and human rights 
activities of the United Nations and other organizations in those areas", but that 
is more a governance issue related to the UN operation itself than to the 
warring parties.  
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3.3.5 Côte d’Ivoire 
Having a look at the mandate of the UN operation in Côte d’Ivoire through a 
good governance lens, it should be clear again that UNOCI is first of all a peace 
and security operation, trying to reach a stand still in the hostilities. In terms of 
governance relevance, it is important to underline, however, that the mandate 
also stresses the need of re-establishing "the authority of the State throughout 
Côte d’Ivoire", of supporting the government as to the organisation of "free, fair 
and transparent elections", of respect for human rights for the future as well as 
during the operation, the promotion of "understanding of the peace process (…) 
through an effective public information capacity", of "restoring a civilian policing 
presence throughout Côte d’Ivoire", and last but not least, of "re-establishing 
the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Côte d’Ivoire". 
Taking the UNESCAP criteria, one can again see that most of them are present 
in the UNOCI’s mandate, although some more explicitly (such as the rule of 
law) and others more implicitly (such as participation and the consensus 
orientation). It is clear, however, that the latter criteria are also very central to 
the UN approach to Côte d’Ivoire. The terminology used in the mandate 
strongly relates to the history of the conflict and the terms used by the Côte 
d’Ivoirian government and the other parties involved, but the core message 
remains the same: how to create governance structures for the long run, in 
order to establish a stable Côte d’Ivoire, which is able to overcome future 
problems by democratic, non-military means. 
 
3.3.6 Sudan  
To what extent is the mandate of UNMIS related to (good) governance? 
Although the mandate does not use the word 'governance', several parts of it 
are overlapping with the good governance criteria as used in this paper. One 
can think of such elements as assisting the parties to the peace agreement "in 
restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to 
develop a police training and evaluation programme, and to otherwise assist in 
the training of civilian police", assisting the parties "in promoting the rule of law, 
including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all 
people of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the 
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aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability and 
to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to develop and 
consolidate the national legal framework", ensuring "an adequate human rights 
presence, capacity, and expertise within UNMIS to carry out human rights 
promotion, civilian protection, and monitoring activities", providing "guidance 
and technical assistance (…) to support the preparations for and conduct of 
elections and referenda provided for by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement", 
contributing towards –  
 
international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan, 
as well as to coordinate international efforts towards the protection of 
civilians with particular attention to vulnerable groups including 
internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and 
children (….).  
 
The expansion of the mandate to Darfur in August 2006 also clearly relates to 
several good governance elements. It will do to recall notions such as assisting 
the parties "in the preparations for and conduct of referendums provided for in 
the Darfur Peace Agreement" and "in promoting the rule of law, including an 
independent judiciary". Further to that the mandate of the operation includes 
the task to assist the parties "to develop and consolidate the national legal 
framework" and as to "the protection of human rights of all people of the Sudan 
through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating 
impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability". The latter is a good 
governance notion par excellence. 
 
 
4 Reflections upon the changing nature of peacekeeping operations  
4.1 Introduction 
As is shown in the description and analysis of the six African cases, UN 
peacekeeping operations are about much more than strict peace and security 
elements only. They time and again refer to good governance related issues, 
from literally working towards building up a stable and accountable government 
to the taking into consideration of core values underlying it, especially respect 
for human rights and the systematic inclusion of minority perspectives in 
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decision-making. The present section further reflects and elaborates upon this 
trend.  
 
4.2 Rwanda and the pressure to create new mandates 
It was mentioned that UN peacekeeping in the 1990s was confronted with 
some dramatic failures. Two of these operations, generally considered to be 
black pages in the UN history of peacekeeping,55 related to Africa: the 
operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II, April 1992- March 1995) and Rwanda 
(UNAMIR, October 1993-March 1996). It would be beyond the scope of this 
paper to discuss them systematically, but given the scope it would be good to 
try to learn some good governance related lessons. These lessons can be 
drawn, for instance, from the work of the Independent Inquiry Commission that 
was given the task by the UN to scrutinise the UN actions during the 1994 
Rwandese genocide.56
While the presence of United Nations peacekeepers in Rwanda may 
have begun as a traditional peacekeeping operation to monitor the 
implementation of an existing peace agreement, the onslaught of the 
genocide should have led decision-makers in the United Nations – 
from the Secretary-General and the Security Council to Secretariat 
officials and the leadership of UNAMIR – to realize that the original 
mandate, and indeed the neutral mediating role of the United 
Nations, was no longer adequate and required a different, more 
assertive response, combined with the means necessary to take 
such action. 
 Although its mandate nor its approach related to, 
technically speaking, governance issues in a narrow sense, it is clear that the 
Rwandese 'non-operation' has made visible on the deepest level one can 
imagine what the operation should have been all about. In the words of the 
Inquiry Commission: 
 
57
Although the word governance is not used by the Inquiry Commission, it should 
be clear that this is what it is all about: changing governance structures and 
tactics in order to protect innocent (and less innocent) people against their 
 
 
                                            
55  See, ia, on the intervention in Rwanda: Dallaire Shake Hands with the Devil; and on 
Somalia: Walter Clark and Herbst (eds) Learning from Somalia. 
56  Commission chaired by Ingvar Carlsson from Sweden. UN Doc S/1999/1257, 16 
December 1999.  
57  Ibid IV at par 19. 
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governments and against one another, and to help creating interim situations 
as well as more durable structures, in which populations can survive firstly and 
subsequently, dare to think in terms of future perspectives. Or in terms of this 
paper: good governance structures, all elements included. In relation to 
UNAMIR, it was observed in a recent PhD thesis that the policy tools Rwanda 
was desperately in need of – such as verification of human rights violations, the 
organisation of elections and election monitoring – were not even included in 
UNAMIR’s mandate, and that "the genocide could take place when good 
governance was nowhere to be found".58
4.3 The character of the (African) conflicts to be addressed 
 That is in a few words one of the core 
lessons to be learnt – and that has been learned – from the crisis in Rwanda. In 
this respect, Rwanda has not been an exclusive case, but together with for 
instance the UN Peacekeeping operation in Bosnia (UNPROFOR 1992-1995) it 
urged new ways of thinking. 
 
Before elaborating upon these 'new ways of thinking' it would be good to spend 
a few additional words upon the conflicts the UN peacekeeping operations in 
Africa have to address. In this paper's section on the present six UN operations 
many specific characteristics of the ongoing conflicts have been mentioned. 
Further to that, however, it would be important to keep in mind that in many 
African cases, leading to peacekeeping operations, almost everything is at 
stake that can be problematic. Many African cases show a multitude of factors 
that should in fact be addressed simultaneously, knowing otherwise that the 
outcome of the operations will never be satisfactory. As a matter of fact the 
descriptions and analyses of the six African cases have already given much 
evidence of that.  
 
In a recent article, Crispin Grey-Johnson, representative of Gambia to the UN, 
states that experts have identified three clusters of factors that give rise to 
conflict, viz, root or structural, proximate and triggers: 
 
 
                                            
58  Van der Lijn Walking the Tightrope 237.  
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Structural factors relate to issues of governance and the functioning 
of State with regard to its relationship with the citizenry, legitimacy, 
ability to provide basic services and mode of governance. They 
manifest themselves in weak or overly strong autocratic 
governments, rampant inequities among the population, corruption, 
discrimination, extreme poverty and deprivation, human rights 
deficiencies and a weakened system of adjudication. These cause 
disaffection among the population, which could eventually lead to 
uprisings, insurgencies and violent confrontation with established 
authority.  
 
Proximate factors differ only by degree from structural causes. When 
discrimination becomes legitimized in the promulgation of laws that 
target a particular ethnic group, religion or clan, or if there is a 
precipitous decline in the standard of living, the conditions of conflict 
become heightened.  
 
These factors are one step removed from the triggers of conflict. 
There are sudden social traumas that spark off hostilities. In 
Rwanda, for example, there were many elements in the relationship 
between the Hutus and Tutsis that constituted structural and 
proximate causes of violence, but it took the shooting down of the 
presidential aircraft to trigger off the genocide.59
the situation after the conflict is one of destruction: infrastructure 
destroyed; basic services, water and fuel supplies, and electricity 
disrupted or lost; and transportation system barely functioning. Many 
professional and skilled personnel would very likely have left the 
country, thus severely circumscribing the ability of institutions to 
function.
 
 
In Grey-Johnson’s words "a typical African country in conflict is poor, with weak 
government and public institutions, a small private sector, high illiteracy, a 
narrow skills base and limited capabilities for guaranteeing security", and that 
state of affairs "is rendered even more dire by civil strife, whose effects on the 
economy and the society at large are debilitating", while –  
 
60
And "even where the structures and institutions of democracy do exist, they are 
usually weak and unable to sustain the workings of a democratic system".
  
 
61
                                            
59  Grey-Johnson 2006 UN Chronicle 
 
Grey Johnson is no doubt right as to his observations on Africa, although one 
http://www.un.org/ 7Jul.  
60  Ibid. 
61  Ibid. 
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should not forget that all these phenomena are not exclusively African. And 
even if there would be a typical African set of problems the solutions to these 
problems would not be typically African. 
 
4.4 From peacekeeping to building stable governance structures  
Apart from being failures in themselves, (non-)operations like the ones in 
Somalia and Rwanda have strongly undermined the authority and credibility of 
the UN in the field of peacekeeping operations. Also in response to that, the UN 
started a systematic reflection upon the failures. One of the first expressions of 
that reflection have been presented in Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for 
Peace (1995), which was in theory a supplement to the 1992 An Agenda for 
Peace, but was in practice to be seen as shaking up the world after the 
disasters in the field of peacekeeping operations of the early and mid 1990s. 
While the 1992 Agenda was written in an optimistic spirit after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet-Union, symbolised amongst other 
things by the fact that the UN Security Council for the first time met at the level 
of heads of states or government (in its famous session of 31 January 1992),62
[When the Security Council met in January 1992] the cold war had 
ended. It was a time of hope and change and of rising expectations 
for – and of – the United Nations. (…) Since the Security Council 
Summit, [however], the pace has accelerated. There have been 
dramatic changes in both the volume and the nature of the United 
Nations activities in the field of peace and security. New and more 
comprehensive concepts to guide those activities, and their links with 
development work, are emerging. Old concepts are being modified. 
There have been successes and there have been failures. The 
Organization has attracted intense media interest, often laudatory, 
more often critical, and all too often focused on only one or two of 
the many peace-keeping operations in which it is engaged, 
overshadowing other major operations and its vast effort in the 
economic, social and other fields.
 
the 1995 Agenda was full of the new sense of reality. See the way this has 
been worded in the introduction to the 1995 Agenda: 
 
63
                                            
62  UN Doc S/23500, 31 January 1992. 
63  UN Doc A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, at par 1. 
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These very illustrative introductory words were followed by a range of 
observations, in which the disastrous operations of the 1990s are used to 
sharpen the focus of the UN peacekeeping operations. Some of these 
observations are relevant from the point of view of the good governance scope 
of the present paper. After having observed that "the new breed of intra-state 
conflicts have certain characteristics that present United Nations peace-
keepers with challenges not encountered since the Congo operation of the 
early 1960s", that these conflicts are "usually fought not only by regular armies 
but also by militias and armed civilians with little discipline and with ill-defined 
chains of command", and that "civilians are the main victims and often the main 
targets", the 1995 Agenda states that "the combatant authorities, in so far as 
they can be called authorities, lack the capacity to cope with them".64
another feature of such conflicts is the collapse of state institutions, 
especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of 
governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry 
and chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended, its 
assets are destroyed or looted and experienced officials are killed or 
flee the country. This is rarely the case in inter-state wars. It means 
that international intervention must extend beyond military and 
humanitarian tasks and must include the promotion of national 
reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government.
 The 
Agenda then adds that –  
 
65
The 1995 Agenda successively discusses the instruments that would be 
available to the UN to do all this – such as preventive diplomacy and 
peacemaking, peace-keeping, post-conflict peace-building, disarmament, 
sanctions, and enforcement action – before concluding as follows: 
 
 
 
The times call for thinking afresh, for striving together and for 
creating new ways to overcome crises. This is because the different 
world that emerged when the cold war ceased is still a world not fully 
understood. The changed face of conflict today requires us to be 
perceptive, adaptive, creative and courageous, and to address 
simultaneously the immediate as well as the root causes of conflict, 
which all too often lie in the absence of economic opportunities and 
social inequities. Perhaps above all it requires a deeper commitment 
                                            
64  Ibid at par 12. 
65  Ibid at par 13.  
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to cooperation and true multilateralism than humanity has ever 
achieved before.66
These words can be seen as realistic and prophetic at the same time. At the 
UN level they have been succeeded five years later by a thorough analysis of 
the UN peacekeeping system and practice by the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations, the previously mentioned 'Brahimi report'.
  
 
67 The Panel 
report criticises the often vague mandates of the Security Council, sending out 
poorly armed and trained soldiers, the inadequate financing and numbers of 
personnel, the inadequate planning, and the mismanagement in the field, et 
cetera,68
(…) 'free and fair' elections should be viewed as part of broader 
efforts to strengthen governance institutions. Elections will be 
successfully held only in an environment in which a population 
recovering from war comes to accept the ballot over the bullet as an 
appropriate and credible mechanism through which their views on 
government are represented. Elections need the support of a 
broader process of democratization and civil society building that 
includes effective civilian governance and a culture of respect for 
basic human rights, lest elections merely ratify a tyranny of the 
majority or be overturned by force after a peace operation leaves.
 but also contains constructive recommendations in the field of 
preventive action and peace-building strategies. In the latter field, the report 
comes up with a series of observations, some of which are directly relevant for 
the core of the present paper, for instance the one on elections: 
 
69
(…) United Nations civilian police monitors are not peacebuilders if 
they simply document or attempt to discourage by their presence 
abusive or other unacceptable behaviour of local police officers – a 
traditional and somewhat narrow perspective of civilian police 
capabilities. Today, missions may require civilian police to be tasked 
to reform, train and restructure local police forces according to 
international standards for democratic policing and human rights, as 
well as having the capacity to respond effectively to civil disorder and 
for self-defence.
 
 
The same goes for the recommendation on police forces and the rule of law:  
 
70
                                            
66  Ibid at par 103. 
67  Supra n 1 UN Doc A/55/305, 21 August 2000. 
68  See Van Genugten et al United Nations of the Future 144-145. 
69  Supra n 1 at par 38. 
70  Ibid at par 39. 
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And for the recommendation on embedding human rights into peacekeeping 
operations: 
 
(…), the human rights component of a peace operation is indeed 
critical to effective peace-building. United Nations human rights 
personnel can play a leading role, for example, in helping to 
implement a comprehensive programme for national reconciliation. 
The human rights components within peace operations have not 
always received the political and administrative support that they 
require, however, nor are their functions always clearly understood 
by other components. Thus, the Panel stresses the importance of 
training military, police and other civilian personnel on human rights 
issues and on the relevant provisions of international humanitarian 
law.71
The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, 
other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex 
peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule 
of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-
conflict environments.
 
 
These observations do lead to a set of 'key recommendations', amongst which 
one can find the following governance related wordings: 
 
72
The tone has thus been set by the Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi report, 
one might say. Their approach can be found back and is elaborated upon in a 
huge number of UN core documents, amongst others – and not the least – in 
the 2005 September Word Summit Outcome document
  
 
73 and Kofi Annan’s In 
larger freedom: towards development. Security and human rights for all,74 
written in preparation of the World Summit. Kofi Annan’s document, after 
having underlined the importance of "transparent, accountable systems of 
governance, grounded in the rule of law, encompassing civil and political as 
well as economic and social rights, and underpinned by accountable and 
efficient public administration",75
                                            
71  Ibid at par 41. 
72  Ibid at par 47 (b). 
73  UN Doc A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005. 
74  UN Doc A/59/2005, 21 March 2005. 
75  Ibid at par 36. 
 contains, amongst other things, the proposal 
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to establish a Peacebuilding Commission. That proposal is grounded in deep 
awareness of the need to establish stable and sustainable institutions after 
conflict:  
 
Our record of success in mediating and implementing peace 
agreements is sadly blemished by some devastating failures. 
Indeed, several of the most violent and tragic episodes of the 1990s 
occurred after the negotiation of peace agreements – for instance in 
Angola in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994. Roughly half of all countries 
that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years. 
These two points drive home the message: if we are going to 
prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are 
implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner. Yet at this very 
point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional 
machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively 
addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from 
war to lasting peace.76
…improve United Nations planning for sustained recovery, focusing 
on early efforts to establish the necessary institutions (…).
 
 
The Peacebuilding Commission would have to be active in the immediate 
aftermath of wars, in order to  
 
77
Further to that, it would have to "provide a forum in which the United Nations, 
major bilateral donors, troop contributors, relevant regional actors and 
organizations, the international financial institutions and the national or 
transitional Government of the country concerned can share information about 
their respective post-conflict recovery strategies (…)", while it also would have 
to "extend the period of political attention to post-conflict recovery".
  
 
78
…if UN Member States could at any stage make use of the 
Peacebuilding Commission’s advice and could request assistance 
from a standing fund for peacebuilding to build their domestic 
institutions for reducing conflict, including through strengthening the 
rule-of-law institutions.
 In 
addition, it would be important, according to In larger freedom,  
 
79
 
  
                                            
76  Ibid at par 114. 
77  Ibid at par 115. 
78  Ibid. 
79  Ibid. 
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Presenting it this way, there are many links to the concept of good governance.  
 
The UN Member States' meeting at the occasion of the 60th Birthday of the UN, 
indeed decided to establish a Peacebuilding Commission "as an 
intergovernmental advisory body",80 focusing "attention on the reconstruction 
and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and support 
the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for 
sustainable development".81
…provide recommendations and information to improve the 
coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United 
Nations, develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing 
for early recovery activities and extend the period of attention by the 
international community to post-conflict recovery.
 In addition, the commission should –  
 
82
Shortly after the summit, the UN General Assembly effectively established the 
Peacebuilding Commission.
  
 
Although the word(s) '(good) governance' are not used, it is clearly and 
basically about nothing else.  
 
83 It is composed of seven members selected by 
the Security Council (as of now including South-Africa), seven members 
elected by the UN Economic and Social Council (as of now including Angola 
(also elected as Chair) and Guinea-Bissau), five "top providers of assessed 
contributions to United Nations budgets and of voluntary contributions to the 
United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, including a standing 
peacebuilding fund" (as of now including The Netherlands), five "top providers 
of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions" (as of now 
including Bangladesh, Ghana and Nigeria), and seven members elected by the 
General Assembly (as of now including Burundi).84
                                            
80  UN Doc A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, at par 97. 
81  Ibid at par 98. 
82  Ibid. 
83  A/RES/60/180, 30 December 2005. 
 Thirty-one members in total, 
but they are supposed to meet (and are actually meeting) "in various 
configurations", as the establishing resolution, following the World Summit 
84  Id and UN http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/membership.shtml 17 Jul.  
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Outcome document, states.85 In the meantime, the commission is operating, 
focusing so far as its country specific meetings are concerned upon two African 
States: Burundi and Sierra-Leone.86
 
 
The Peacebuilding Commission can be seen as one of the bridges between 
good intentions and daily peacekeeping reality, practicing many of the thoughts 
and recommendations put forward in the Brahimi report. Apart from the 
installment of this new body, however, practice has already changed since the 
mid 1990s, anticipating upon ‘the spirit of Brahimi’, one might say. Since the 
major failures, the UN Security Council started paying in a more systematic way 
attention to humanitarian and human rights issues, even leading to some 
operations in which the military component became less relevant and in which 
civilian specialists on human rights, humanitarian law, constitutional law and 
elections are given a dominant presence. As to the latter, one can think of the 
UN operation in Kosovo (1999 until present).87 Working closely with Kosovo’s 
leaders, the mission as a matter of fact performs the whole spectrum of 
essential administrative functions and services covering such areas as health 
and education, banking and finance, post and telecommunications, and law and 
order.88
The Brahimi report underscored the necessity of multi-dimensional 
missions. Therefore, as an initial step in the process of establishing a 
peacekeeping operation, United Nations Head Quarters in New York 
sets up an Integrated Mission Task Force, which includes expertise 
  
 
In the actual performance of the African operations as discussed in this paper, 
the influence of the Brahimi report is also strongly visible. In 2006, the Dutch 
Major General Patrick C Cammaert, Commanding the Eastern Division of 
MONUC in the DRC, was asked by Tilburg University to reflect upon changes 
in UN peacekeeping after the Brahimi report. His observations from the field 
deserve serious attention: 
 
                                            
85  A/RES/60/180, 30 December 2005, at par 3. 
86  For a short overview of activities so far, see UN http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/ 17 
Jul.  
87  SC Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999.  
88  UN http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm 17 Jul.  
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from the various components of the UN system such as: the Military, 
Political, Rule of Law, Human Rights, Child Protection, 
Administration, Public Information (…). In essence UN forces can 
only be effective if their activities are planned, coordinated and 
echeloned into a Mission area of responsibility in a complementary 
manner (…). It is crucial that the various components communicate 
and work hand in hand. The components should understand that 
they are mutually dependant and should work together, through 
information sharing, particularly in areas such as how to protect the 
force, protection of civilians under imminent threat, investigations of 
human rights violations, etc.89
In MONUC, the military component and the human rights division 
work closely together not only at the level of the Head Quarters in 
Kinshasa but also in the field (MONUC has some 15 field offices 
across the country with a total of 110 Human Rights Officers). 
Military operations are always planned in close collaboration with our 
human rights colleagues to engage spoilers of the peace and 
electoral process as well as violators of human rights. Military 
operations usually result in a displacement of villagers who are then 
in need of shelter, food, medical care, security, etc. To effectively 
address this fall-out is yet another task of MONUC. The military 
component is also mandated to ensure the protection and security of 
the Human Rights Officers who are investigating the abuses. Our 
force has sustained casualties in some tragic circumstances whilst 
escorting civilian human rights colleagues doing their work – all part 
of our military business but a frustrating part nonetheless.
 
 
And specifically in relation to MONUC: 
 
90
As observed by Cammaert in daily practice, since the Brahimi report has been 
published the UN Secretariat is playing an increasing role in the analysis, 
design, organisation and leadership of the operations, including a focus upon a 
better preparation of the military and civilian means provided by the member 
states. The staff of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has since the 
beginning of the Millennium been extended by almost 50%, especially the sub-
departments of the military advisor, the civilian police and training particularly 
benefiting from this.
  
 
91
                                            
89  Cammaert 
 
 
http://www.books4life.nl/ 12 Jul. 
90  Ibid. 
91  Van Genugten et al supra n 68 at 144-145. 
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Further to this, it is relevant to mention that the previously discussed 2005 UN 
Summit document touches upon "the importance of contributions to peace and 
security by regional organizations and of forging predictable partnerships and 
arrangements between the United Nations and regional organizations", thereby 
"noting in particular, given the special needs of Africa, the importance of a 
strong African Union".92 During the last decade, African lead nations and 
African organisations have been strongly reflecting upon their roles in 
peacekeeping at the African continent.93 In the words of Jakkie Cilliers: "Africa 
is (…) experiencing a revival of the belief that peace enforcement can best be 
conducted outside of the UN framework by regional groupings of the willing".94 
These African states and organisations also know, however, that until now, they 
often have not been able to fulfil the high expectations they are confronted – 
and confronted themselves – with, and that, especially given the complexities of 
the situations to deal with, acting without close cooperation with the UN would 
not be very realistic.95
5 Summary and concluding observations  
  
 
 
Crispin Grey-Johnson, the Gambian representative to the UN quoted before, 
observes that  
 
by giving too much prominence to security responsibilities that need 
a military predominance in UN peace operations, the requirements 
for reconstruction, rehabilitation and relaunching of democratic and 
economic development processes are downplayed and become 
unresponsive to the need for recovery and the functioning of basic 
infrastructure and government services.96
Wording the problems this way, he is touching upon the core issue of this 
paper. A focus upon military aspects might be needed and might even have to 
  
 
                                            
92  UN Doc A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, at par 93. 
93  See eg Malan Peacekeeping in Africa; De Coning 2002 Conflict Trends 46-56; Samii 
Peace Operations in Africa; Anon 2004 Strategic Comments.  
94  Cilliers 2003 African Security Review. 
95  Anon 2004 The Economist http://www.economist.com/ 12 Jul at 46. 
96  Grey-Johnson supra n 59. 
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be given priority, depending on the concrete situation, but if it is not 
incorporated in a broader analysis of the situation and in a full range of 
measures and activities, UN peacekeeping operations will never contribute or 
ultimately lead to stable solutions. Conflicts will reoccur as soon as the 
operations have ended, for instance because temporarily side-lined leaders will 
again take up their weapons or will start supporting new generations of rebels, 
telling them what kind of injustice is done to them.  
 
In this paper it is shown that the times are changing and that the (desirability of) 
military predominance in UN peace operations is not so clear anymore. 
Discussing the six ongoing UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, it is shown 
that in most cases, despite differences, a clear ‘second focus’ upon good 
governance issues, as framed in this paper, has been inserted in or added to 
the mandates.  
 
The presentation and discussion of the six mandates was followed by a further 
reflection upon trends in UN peacekeeping that have occurred after the major 
failures of the 1990s. In that respect, the paper firstly refers to the analysis 
made of the Rwandese disaster by the Independent Inquiry Commission ("the 
onslaught of the genocide should have led decision-makers in the United 
Nations (…) to realize that the original mandate was no longer adequate"); 
followed by some observations as to the complex situation in many African 
countries. They are, as Grey-Johnson observes, characterised by poverty, 
weak public institutions, a small private sector, high illiteracy, a narrow skills 
base and limited capabilities for guaranteeing security, all this being 
accompanied by civil strife, while the situation after the conflict is often one of 
total destruction.  
 
Having thus underlined the complexity of African conflicts, it becomes more 
clear than ever that the UN is seriously in need of new approaches in 
peacekeeping land. These ways of thinking about and handling of 
peacekeeping operations have especially been captured into words by the 
1995 Agenda and the 2000 Brahimi report, although it can also be observed 
that practices were already (slightly) changing some time before the reports 
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were published. The reports reflect a good interplay between needs felt on the 
ground and expressed by military practitioners, and theoretical reflection upon 
that. Especially the Brahimi report strongly criticises what went wrong in the 
past, but also comes up with a range of constructive observations and 
recommendations, inter alia in relation to good governance notions as 
expressed in this paper. In the words of the panel there should indeed be  
 
a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law 
elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations. 
 
In later years, the approach taken by the Brahimi report has been practiced, so 
to say, although not as a handbook that provide for solutions for all kinds of 
concrete cases. It serves more as a general source of inspiration, expressing 
the overall approach that should be followed. Practical translations can be 
found in some of the (revised) mandates of the six African operations, but also, 
in a more structural sense, in the strengthening of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations and the establishment, in 2005, of the Peacebuilding 
Commission. Although the word(s) '(good) governance' are not used in the 
mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission, it is clearly meant to deliver 
decisive contributions to that. On a practical note it is also observed in the 
paper that the African Union keeps seeking for a balance between solving 
African problems of its own and cooperation with, inter alia, the UN. Sometimes 
it is thought that one could and should do without the UN, but reality so far 
makes clear that in many problematic situations that would be a problematic 
route. That is to a large extent related to the complexity of the issues that have 
to be solved, but also to the lack of leadership and preparedness and ability to 
transcend the level of daily struggling.  
 
But there is more. Taking into account that all African cases in which the UN 
assists or intervenes by means of a peacekeeping operation or in which it will 
have to assist or intervene in the future – have their specific characteristics, it 
would not be easy to identify a range of factors that have to be taken into 
account in order to improve the chances of a successful completion of UN 
missions. There is no simple or uniform recipe. Nevertheless, I would like to 
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conclude this paper with three observations that would be relevant for all 
operations:  
 
• Firstly, take care of the economic root causes of conflicts, including 
especially the issue of abuse of natural resources. It is the economic 
dimension of conflicts, which is not discussed in this good governance 
oriented paper, but which is in many cases of primordial interest.  
• Secondly, invest systematically in governmental structures and legal 
institutions, while seriously training police, army and judiciary staff, in 
terms of the skills they have to learn and the values they have to take 
into account while acting. The latter is about respect for the human rights 
of those they are dealing with, of participation by neglected minorities, of 
seriously obstructing the standard practice of using violent means to 
resolve conflicts, but also about corruption and other legitimacy 
undermining activities.  
• Thirdly, take care of a good interplay with local, regional and national 
governments, and with mixes of state and non-state actors such as land 
lords and associations of farmers, with regional intergovernmental 
organisations, with non-governmental organisations, with individual 
human rights officers, with International Financial Institutions and UN 
Specialised Organisations, as well as with whatever persons and 
organisations that might deliver fruitful contributions to ending conflicts 
and building up sustainable, human rights friendly governance 
structures.  
 
It should be added in all modesty that there is by far no guarantee that efforts 
conducted along these lines will be successful. The ‘old way’, however, is 
anyhow destined to fail.  
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